Danger: local corruption is contagious! by González López-Valcárcel, Beatriz et al.
 
 
 
Danger: local corruption is contagious! 
 
 
Beatriz G. López-Valcarcel 
(Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria) 
Juan Luis Jiménez 
(Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria) 
Jordi Perdiguero 
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) 
 
 
CÀTEDRA PASQUAL MARAGALL D’ECONOMIA I TERRITORI 
 
COL·LECCIÓ DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL 
 
Entitat col·laboradora:  
 
WORKING PAPER 01/2015 
DANGER:  LOCAL CORRUPTION IS CONTAGIOUS! 
 
Beatriz G. Lopez-Valcarcel1 Juan Luis Jiménez2 Jordi Perdiguero3 
 
 
Abstract 
Corruption is a major problem, and not only in developing countries. It impedes economic 
growth, weakens the rule of law and undermines the legitimacy of institutions. Although it 
has been studied at national level from different perspectives, there is a recent growing 
body of research on local corruption. As far as we know, these latter studies focused on 
corruption and its effects on votes. However, a further question arises as to whether there 
is a mimetic effect on neighbouring municipalities? We employ data from Spain, and the 
boom in local corruption in the 2000s, to respond to this question. Specifically we have 
constructed a panel database (2001-2010) on local characteristics, economic factors and 
corruption at local level in order to achieve this. Our spatial econometrics methodology 
supports the hypothesis that corruption is not local-specific, and leads to two opposing 
outcomes: on the one hand, local corruption is contagious and the probability of being 
‘infected’ increases by 3.1 per cent for each corrupt neighbouring municipality; on the other 
hand the likelihood of a municipality being taken to court increases by 6.7 per cent for each 
neighbouring municipality accused. Although the former is alarming, the latter provides 
hope in the fight against local corruption. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Corruption is a major problem, and not only in developing countries. It impedes economic 
growth (Mauro, 1995), weakens the rule of law and undermines the legitimacy of 
institutions. Corrupt governments or officials can only be ‘punished’ periodically at the 
ballot box (or not).4  
In Spain corruption is a growing problem as can be seen in CIS’ surveys from the 1980’s 
until the present day.5 These surveys show that recently between 35% and 40% of those 
surveyed believe that corruption is one of the main problems of the nation, after 
unemployment. This opinion is not only unique to Spain. As can be seen in the recent 
report of the European Commission (2014), 76% of respondents believe that corruption is 
widespread in their country. This percentage is even higher in countries such as Greece 
(99%), Italy (97%), Lithuania and the Czech Republic (95%). Therefore, it is a problem that 
people view with great and growing concern. 
The World Bank defines corruption as “the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests” (Kaufmann et al, 2010). It additionally emphasizes the “capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies”. In developed countries, corruption 
is above all, political corruption (Jiménez, 2013), commited by government officials who 
use their powers and trade in influence for illegitimate private gain. This is the kind of 
corruption on which we focus in this investigation. 
Although studies have analyzed the possible spread of corruption among countries (Becker 
et al, 2009), and the effect of local corruption on variables such as voting intentions 
(Jiménez and García, 2012; or Ferraz and Finan, 2008), we were unable to identify any 
paper in the literature that has analyzed the possible spatial spread of local corruption.6 
This paper aims to fill this gap by providing empirical evidence on whether there is spatial 
contagion in cases of corruption (whether it is at the time it is commited or when the legal 
system detects it; this will be expanded upon and clarified below). First it seeks to identify if 
corruption has a knock-on effect in neighbouring municipalities. In this case, an act of 
corruption would not only generate welfare losses in the municipality that carries it out, but 
also in neighbouring municipalities, since it increases the likelihood that these 
municipalities commit corrupt acts in the future. Second, if the imputation of a 
municipality for the realization of a corrupt act increased the likelihood of nearby 
municipalities being charged, this would mean that there is some positive externality in the 
                                                 
4 See detailed references in section two. 
5 CIS is the Spanish acronym for the Sociological Research Centre, a public organization that is part of the 
Ministry of the Presidency and undertakes statistical public opinion surveys. 
6 As we will explain at next section, there are some papers that analyze this topic but not at local level. 
legal investigation. Once the law identifies a case of corruption, there is an increased 
likelihood of nearby municipalities being charged in the future. 
Providing empirical evidence of the existence of this spatial pattern is the main 
contribution of this paper. To perform the empirical analysis we have constructed a single 
database that includes all cases of imputed municipal corruption in Spain from 2000 to 
2011.7 
The empirical results show the existence of a clear pattern of spatial clustering in the 
corruption cases that have been identified by the legal system. These results allow us to 
draw conclusions for public policy, such as the need for greater control of municipal 
actions to avoid negative spillover to other municipalities. These controls can be greater for 
a public body, and may necessitate greater transparency in municipal activities, so that 
citizens of a particular town have greater control over their leader.  
After this brief introduction, section two outlines the scarce academic literature on this 
topic. Section three describes how the database was constructed. Section four details the 
empirical strategy that drew on a geographical information system (GIS) data and a spatial 
data estimations model. Finally section five is devoted to results and policy implications.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Corruption is a complex phenomenon that can be approached from multiple perspectives, 
from the decision of an individual to engage in a corrupt act (Dong et al, 2012) to complex 
information asymmetry models that seek to reduce corruption levels (Ryvkin and Serra, 
2012). Within this vast literature we distinguish three elements that we shall analyze in 
depth. 
First is the analysis of factors that can influence the level of corruption in a country. One 
element in this analysis is the level of political decentralization. Economic theory predicts a 
contradictory relationship between the level of economic and political decentralization, and 
the level of corruption. Some of the reasons that lead us to relate political decentralization 
with a higher level of corruption include the idea that good bureaucrats (Brueckner, 1999), 
or the best professionals in central government (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), are less likely 
to be attracted to local municipalities, and there is a possible double marginalization, which 
would generate an excess of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
However, it is also argued that competition between local governments to engage citizens 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) in part due to their proximity and capacity to provide better 
information (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), or the ease of supervision and control of local 
bureaucrats, should lead to a reduction in the level of corruption. Empirically various 
scholars have attempted to address this question. For example, Fisman and Gatti (2002) 
                                                 
7 Using a US legal system approach, this term is similar to ‘indicted’ or ‘implicated’. 
have used empirical evidence to argue that greater decentralization leads to a lower level of 
corruption in the country. This effect is maintained, they contend, even when the level of 
decentralization is considered endogenous in the models. More recently, Fan et al (2009) 
found a positive relationship between the number of bureaucratic levels (as a proxy of the 
level of decentralization) and the level of corruption, but only for less developed countries. 
A second element that can affect the level of corruption in a country is the level of 
economic freedom. Countries with more economic freedom, supported by private 
initiative, tolerate corruption much less, which lead them to have a lower level. Pieroni and 
D'Agostini (2013) show econometrically that countries with greater economic freedom (as 
measured by policy competition, employment regulation or protection of property rights) 
have lower levels of perceived corruption. 
A third element analyzed in the economic literature is the level of international integration. 
As countries integrate economically it is possible that increased trade flows, foreign direct 
investment or the number of transnational companies mean that good business practices 
and anti-corruption practices are transmitted to the country, thereby reducing the level of 
corruption. Sandholtz and Gray (2003) proved the existence of this relationship empirically, 
and concluded that economic integration would help significantly reduce the level of 
corruption. This same study showed a positive relationship between the level of corruption 
in a country and the level of its neighbours. As in Sandholtz and Gray (2003), Goel and 
Nelson (2007) found a positive relationship between the level of corruption in 
neighbouring states and the level of corruption in the state analyzed. The authors use U.S. 
state level data over the period 1995-2004 to identify the factors that affect the average 
conviction rate for corruption in the states under study. Finally, Dong and Torgler (2012), 
found evidence on the spread of local corruption in China. 
A second topic analyzed in depth in the literature is the relationship between the level of 
corruption and the political cost, in terms of votes, for the political parties involved. 
Focusing on the case of Spain, that has been widely used following the local corruption 
boom in the noughties, Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero (2010) evaluated the effect of 
corruption cases on local election results in Andalucía (the most populous Autonomous 
Community in Spain) in the period 2003-2007 using the ordinary least squares method. 
However they did not find any electoral effect resulting from these cases. Costas-Pérez et al 
(2012) also analyze this topic using data from Spain (period 1999-2007) by employing a 
difference-in-difference estimator. They conclude that the average vote loss after a 
corruption scandal was approximately 4%, although the punishment is greater in cases that 
receive widespread media attention (up to 9%). 
Finally, Jiménez and García (2012) expand the analysis of local corruption incidents to the 
period 2000-2011, including not only local cases but also regional ones. Their research 
leads to two main conclusions: that following imputation in a local corruption case, voting 
abstention increases by an average of 1.8 percentage points; and that there are partisan 
effects by voters regarding local corruption. 
This article focuses on the third widely analyzed topic in the literature such as the spatial 
spread of corruption among the different agents under study8. Like in health or in crime 
rate analyses (see for example, Messner and Anselin, 2004), the study of corruption needs 
an econometric model that allows for countries interdependence. Becker et al (2009) 
undertook this approach9 and employed their results to argue that corruption spreads 
across national borders because of business activity (economic integration) or by 
demonstration effects, among others. Using a cross-section of 123 countries the authors 
employed a spatial lag estimation of perceived corruption. They found that the endogenous 
variable in a country i is an adjacency or inverse-distance related function of perceived 
corruption in other countries. The authors conclude that, although own country 
characteristics are more important than those of a country’s neighbours, there is evidence 
of contiguous effects of corruption. They argue therefore that it is a regional 
phenomenon.10 Similarly Seldadyo et al (2010) using spatial econometric models found a 
significant positive relationship between the level of governance of a country and the level 
of governance in neighbouring countries. The authors show how the level of governance 
of the 10 closest neighbouring countries significantly influences the level of governance in 
a particular country. 
Although corruption is a heavily analyzed topic and that spatial dependence in agents’ 
decision-making has been tested empirically, there are not in the literature, at least to our 
knowledge, any empirical articles that analyze if there is contagion in corruption at local 
level. This fact is surprising considering that spatial dependence in the level of corruption 
at the macroeconomic level (when the level of perceived corruption in the country in 
general is analyzed) has been tested econometrically. This is the reason that we decided to 
look for ‘spillovers’ at local level, ie local corruption contagion. If this effect is proven, then 
it provides new arguments to justify public spending increases for judges, police and 
supervising agencies in order to prevent it. These arguments are based on the positive 
externality of preventing new cases of corruption. To our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical analysis of cross-border spillover of corruption at local level using longitudinal 
data and a spatial dynamic panel model.  
 
THE DATABASE AND THE CLUSTERIZING OF LOCAL 
CORRUPTION  
The database consists of annual data on all Spanish municipalities with a population greater 
than 1,000, in the period 2000 to 2011 (n=3,413). It includes three main types of variables: 
                                                 
8 Spatial dependence on public decisions (taxes, public expenditure, etc.) has been analyzed in papers such as 
Brueckner (2003). 
9 Seldadyo et al (10) make a similar analysis but they focused on governance. 
10 Márquez et al (2011) replicate the analysis but using more observations and different explanatory variables. 
They found a weak spatial correlation, and therefore concluded that corruption is not contagious. See also 
Attila (2008) for a similar example. 
local corruption cases (the year in which they occurred and the year of legal imputation), 
municipalities’ characteristics and geographical data. The former relates to the number of 
corruption cases under judicial investigation by municipality in Spain, in the period 2000-
2011. These cases include not only those in which the mayor is involved, but also cases 
involving any other person(s) under investigation who are directly related to the party 
considered. We define an alleged offence as a case of corruption only when the accused has 
been imputed or impeached by the legal system. For all cases, we take into account not 
only the imputation date but also the date when the offence was committed.11 
Regarding the municipalities’ characteristics, we have included data provided by the Spain 
Economic Yearbook 2013 by La Caixa.12 Data on population and economic activity have 
also been taken into account. With regard to geographical data, we have created two 
squared matrixes for the 3,413 municipalities: an adjacency matrix and a distance matrix. 
The adjacency matrix is a 0/1 matrix containing a 1 if the row municipality i is adjacent to 
the column municipality j. The distance matrix contains distances between each pair of 
municipalities, calculated from the respective coordinates (longitude and latitude). We used 
a spatial tool developed with the ArcGIS Model Builder in order to automatically detect 
adjacencies.13 
The variables included in the analysis are the following: 
(i) Corruptedi: binary variable that takes the value 1 if there has been a case of 
corruption in the municipality i at any moment in the period 1999-2011. In 
some estimations, we use the dynamic version of the variable, which takes the 
value 1 if the municipality has had a legal case of corruption before that year or 
starting that year. Source: Own elaboration (see previous paragraphs). 
(ii) Imputated: binary variable equal to 1 if a new case of corruption started in the 
municipality i at year t. We also consider the date when the offence was 
committed (see the estimations included in Table 3.) 
(iii) Bi-annual rate of populationit: this variable is the average of two different growth rates, 
i) the annual variation of population from year t-1 to year t, and ii) the annual 
variation of population from year t-2 to t-1, for every municipality i. Costas-
Pérez et al (2012) also employed this method, but they used four-year lagged 
growth rates. 
(iv) Local property gross tax base (IBI)it: this variable refers to the gross tax rate of the local 
property tax in every municipality for each year of the database. We include it 
to capture the degree of urban development and its value, as recommended by 
                                                 
11 We use the same database that was constructed by Jiménez and García (2012). The database has been self-
elaborated. 
12 http://www.anuarieco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com/ 
13 We acknowledge the assistance of Rafael Suárez with this question. 
Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero (2010). Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Administraciones Públicas. 
(v) Density of populationit: this is the density of population of the municipality i at year t. 
Source: La Caixa municipal database. 
(vi) Index on Economic activityit: this is an index that summarizes buying power by local 
consumers. It is a relative index on economic activity formed by all trade tax 
revenues (Impuesto de actividades económicas, IAE) paid by firms on each city. It 
measures the municipality’s percentage contribution of the national trade tax 
revenues for the year 2011. Source: La Caixa municipal database. 
(vii) Islandi: binary variable that takes value 1 if the municipality i is located on an 
island. 
(viii) Areai: municipality area in km
2. Source: La Caixa municipal database. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics by municipality. We consider two types of 
municipality: corrupt (C) - those in which there has been at least one allegation of local 
corruption in the period 1999-2010 and non-corrupt (NC). 
Data show that corrupted municipalities have higher rates of population turnover, and are 
richer in properties, with greater density and size, than non-corrupted municipalities. The 
data also show that the municipalities free from cases of corruption form a heterogeneous 
group. This is partly due to the fact that there are more than 3,000 uncorrupted 
municipalities (against close to 200 corrupted). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by municipality (2004, 2008, 2010) 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
C NC C NC C NC C NC 
Demographical 
change 
0.026 0.017 0.037 0.04 
-
0.10 
-1 0.29 0,94 
Properties local 
gross tax rate (IBI) 
2011364 283023 1e7 1532308 0 0 1.6e8 7.5e7 
Density of 
population 
765.13 348.4 1712.4 1254.7 5.73 0 17151.4 22401 
Index on economic 
activity 
131.5 22.4 521.5 91.2 2 0 7387 3935 
Island 0.12 0.04 - - 0 0 1 1 
Area (km2) 143.2 92.3 201.5 124.1 1 0 1675 1750 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Note: C: Corrupted municipality; NC: Non-corrupted municipality. 
 
As we shall see, in Spain indictments of corruption have a clear geographical pattern, with 
clusters of contigous municipalities showing a history of indictments. That pattern could be 
the effect of various causes, each with different consequences for anti-corruption policy. 
We will distinguish three types of causes: 
1) Justice organization: in some judicial districts prosecutors are more active. Spatial patterns 
would not therefore be the consequence of more corruption, but the result of more 
criminal investigation and judicial control in the area. Nevertheless, in Spain there is a 
special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor located in Madrid that “investigates and examines the 
processes of particular importance, relating to economic and other offences committed by 
public officials in the exercise of their rights related to the phenomenon of corruption 
charges” (see Ministry of Justice webpage). 
2) Common context and common shocks: neighbouring municipalities share cultural, historic and 
institutional settings and perhaps some specific market characteristics (such as high 
demand for land because, for instance, of the potential for tourism). Neighbouring 
municipalities could, for example, share a touristic expansion area, or beaches. They could 
also share local firms (such as building companies, banks, etc.) that might gradually develop 
management styles based on corruption. They might also share political organizations and 
political party colours. As the press reports, generally the geographic domain of political 
influence of a Godfather in Spain covers the province. For that reason we controlled 
provinces in our models. In the past, shared social capital served to spread ‘evil’, such as 
the case of Nazism in Germany (Satyanath et al, 2013). In some other cases, crimes spread 
over several contigous municipalities; for instance the Mafia has been known to offer 
money for municipal licenses to build and to urbanize land that extends over several coastal 
municipalities. 
3) True interaction: that is diffusion of corruption through direct interaction or contagion 
(emulation effects, envy of neighbours’ unpunished enrichment, yardstick competition etc.; 
see Becker et al, 2009, for information about the state at national level). 
The following figure 1a shows all the municipalities included in the database. Red 
municipalities are corrupt, while blue ones are not. These graphs illustrate several 
interesting points. Firstly, the geographical distribution of small municipalities across Spain 
in non-coastal regions (remember that those cities with less than 1,000 inhabitants are not 
included. While they represent more than 60 per cent of total municipalities in Spain, they 
include less than 5 per cent of the total population).14 
Secondly, that local corruption has occurred across almost all regions in Spain, (which is 
why no regional pattern appears). And finally, and most importantly, that some of the red 
areas are clustered (i.e., there is a local geographical pattern among the municipalities 
accused.  
                                                 
14 Those regions are mainly Castilla-León, Castilla La Mancha, Madrid and Aragón. 
Figure 1a. Local corruption. Mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands, 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. We include only municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants. 
 
Figure 1b. Accused municipalities analyzed by the year the corrupt act was 
committed. Mainland Spain and Balearic Islands, 1984-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 Figure 1c. Accused municipalities by year of imputation. Mainland Spain and 
Balearic Islands, 2002-2012 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figures 1b and 1c seem to illustrate patterns of spatial spreading. It seems that if a 
municipality’s politicians are accused of corruption, this is often followed, after one or 
more years, by contiguous municipalities.  
For the Canary Islands, the local pattern is even more evident as can be seen in the 
following figures. 
 
Figure 2a. Local corruption. Canary Islands, 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 2b. Accused municipalities by year that the corrupt act was committed. 
Canary Islands, 1994-2011. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 2c. Accused municipalities by year of imputation. Canary Islands, 2001-2011. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Before modeling econometrically, it would be useful to test for the presence of spatial 
patterns in the distribution of corruption. A classical test used frequently is the Moran test, 
but this is designed for quantitative variables and should not be applied to binary data. A t-
test comparing the percentage of corrupted municipalities out of all the adjacent 
municipalities shows significant results (F=93.94, p= 0.0000). On average, non imputated 
municipalities have 6.6% of their neighbours imputated, while 17.7% of the municipalities 
adjacent to the imputed ones have also been imputed. Therefore, statistical association is 
clearly showing a pattern of spatial correlation in the local corruption phenomenon in 
Spain. However, in order to analyze this further a more detailed econometric analysis needs 
to be implemented. 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
As noted above, our main goal is to test whether local corruption in Spain is contagious 
(i.e. whether it shows a spatial pattern, so that if a municipality suffers a corruption case 
today, then the probability of having a new case of corruption in adjacent municipalities in 
that year or afterwards significantly increases). For analytical reasons we separately identify: 
‘corruption contagious’ and ‘imputation contagious’. Corruption contagious refers to the 
fact that the act of corruption itself may be contagious. By imputation contagious, on the 
other hand, we mean that it is possibly more probable for the law to detect cases of 
corruption in a municipality after detection or imputation in some adjacent municipality or 
municipalities.  
To achieve this goal, we shall apply an econometric model that allows for cross-sectional 
interdependence. However, we not only performed a cross-sectional analysis, but also 
implemented a dynamic approach, which greatly increases the number of observations and 
allows us to model the starting of a corruption case as a function of the neighbours 
contemporary or past cases of corruption. This issue, to our knowledge, has not been 
applied in any of the previous references we have detailed in section 2. 
Manski (1993) described the reflection problem when estimating social interactions as 
“similar to that of interpreting the almost simultaneous movements of a person and his reflection in a 
mirror. Does the mirror image cause the person's movements or reflect them?”. The longitudinal nature 
of our data allows us to estimate the effect of social interactions (contagion), thereby 
avoiding the problem of reflection (Manski, 1993). Politicians of a municipality who 
commit an act of corruption in a given year can infect politicians neighbouring 
municipalities that year and in subsequent years. Corruption clusters of municipalities could 
arise because the municipalities in the area share common contextual conditions that favor 
or disfavour corruption: history, culture, institutions or economic conditions (such as 
tourist affluence). 
Our spatial econometric approach assumes that the channel of interdependence is 
positively related to adjacency or inversely with distance. So, the formal expression of our 
model is the following (as for example detailed in Becker et al, 2009): 
Prob(pi = 1 | Xi ,Wi ,Ci ) = F(b0 + l wij pj + biXi + e i
i =1
K
å
j =1
N-1
å )
where
e i = r wije j +n i
j =1
N-1
å
    [1] 
where pi is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the municipality i has suffered a local 
corruption case. Wi is the matrix of geographical weights for municipality i and Ci is the 
Nx1 vector of binary data on corruption. Due to the binary structure of the endogenous 
variable, we implement binomial probit estimation models. Φ stands for the cumulative 
standard normal probability. Exogeneous covariates that contribute to explaining the 
likelihood of being accused are denoted by Xi.; and the most important variables are wij and 
the structure of error term. The former is an adjacency-related weight that takes value 1 if 
the municipality i is a neighbour of j. The latter is split into two terms: a spatial correlation 
in the residuals (measure by  ) and an iid error term. 
Regarding the former, wij is an adjacency-related weight with the following two properties: 
wij  1
j1
N
  and wii=0. However, we use three different approaches to this matrix: firstly, we 
consider a municipality-by-municipality matrix, which takes value 1 if two municipalities are 
neighbours; secondly we use a normalization approach that divides all unitary entries by the 
sum of all neighbours for each municipality; finally we apply an inverse euclidean distance 
matrix, calculated from the coordinates (longitude and latitude) of the centre of the 
municipalities. 
The contagion term in equation [1],  wij p j
j1
N1
 , can be written using matrix notation WiCi, 
where Wi contains the weights, based in distance or adjacency, for municipality i and Ci is 
the column 0/1 vector with cij 1  if municipality j has been imputed. Therefore, we can 
write eq[1] using the matrix notation:  
[2] 
In all cases, the general equation [2] includes as explanatory variables (X) demographical 
variables, property taxes, density of population, area, economic activity and the dummy for 
island, as defined in section 3. As neighbour’s corruption (vector Ci) may be endogenous, 
and contagion is mutual, we used instrumental variables. The instruments, as in Becker et al 
(2009), are WX, W2X, W3X. In a dynamic context (panel models) our instruments may 
satisfy the exclusion restriction for identification. However it is recognized that the cross-
section version of the model could suffer from the reflection problem. 
 
RESULTS 
First, we estimate the binomial probit using cross section data for the last year considered 
(2010). The endogenous variable in this case takes value 1 if the municipality considered 
has ever been accused across the full period (and 0 in other case). Covariates considered are 
for the year 2010. 
Three Instrumental Variable estimations have been undertaken over 3,047 municipalities 
(we exclude those that present some missing values). The standard errors have been 
adjusted for error correlations among municipalities in the same province. The main 
explanatory variable is the neighbour’s corruption. 
Prob(pi =1|Xi,Wi,Ci ) = F(lWiCi + X 'i b +ei )
Table 2 shows results for the three matrixes considered: adjacency -i.e., the number of 
neighbours that have been accused at any time in the period 2001-2010-; adjacency 
normalized and inverse distance matrix. 
 
Table 2. Static Probit estimation. Instrumental variables. 
Explanatory variables Adjacency 
Normalized 
adjacency 
Distance weights 
Neighbour corruption  0.439 (0.10)*** 2.165 (0.57)** 2.089 (0.87)** 
Demographical change 1.063 (2.04) 1.183 (1.94) 1.373 (1.97) 
Property gross tax base 3e-8 (4e-8) 3e-8 (4e-8) 3e-8 (4e-8) 
Population density 2e-5 (4e-5) 1e-7 (4e-5) 2e-6 (4e-6) 
Index on economic activity -1e-4 (7e-4) 2e-4 (8e-4) 1.9e-4 (8e-4) 
Island 0.258 (0.115)** 0.237 (0.11)** 0.245 (0.12)** 
Area 6e-4 (2e-4)*** 9e-4 (2e-4)*** 9e-4 (2e-4)*** 
Constant -2.111 (0.06)*** -2.142 (0.06)*** -2.142 (0.07)*** 
Observations 3,047 3,047 3,047 
Wald chi2(7) 198.76*** 136.75*** 126.67*** 
Wald test of exogeneity (Prob>chi2) 0.04 0.16 0.24 
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
Wald test of exogeneity (last row of Table 2) shows that instruments are valid. The most 
important general conclusion of the models is that corrupted neighbours increase the 
likelihood of a corrupted municipality. In fact, the adjacency model shows that for each 
corrupted neighbour a municipality has its score (in the standard Normal distribution scale) 
increase by 0.44 units. That is a large effect and it is invariant for both the imputation date 
and for the date when the offence was committed. 
The only significant covariates are the dummy for municipalities located on islands, which 
are more likely to be corrupted; also size is a significant variable as larger municipalities are 
more likely to be imputed. 
However, estimations in Table 2 do not consider the potential time effect, i.e. the dynamic 
behaviour of local corruption in Spain. To solve this problem we consider the panel 
structure of data. In this case, the endogenous variable pit takes value 1 if the municipality i 
has a local corruption case starting in year t. As once a municipality has been imputated 
there is ‘no way back’ (that is, pit=1 after the imputation year), and as those observations do 
not add any information to the sample likelihood, we skip them from the panel estimation 
sample. 
Consequently, Table 3, reporting the panel data estimation, outperfoms cross-section 
analysis due to the likelihood of a municipality being accused if a neighbouring municipality 
has been previously accused. We used Arellano´s first differences Instrumental Variables 
estimation method. The model is linear, its dependent variable is the binary pit. and the 
instruments are defined as above. 
Moreover we separate estimations firstly for different matrix structures (as in Table 2), and 
secondly for the date of imputation (see the imputation column in Table 3) and when the 
offence was committed (see the corruption column in Table 3). The latter data helps us 
identify not only whether a contagious effect exists but also whether crime or punishment is 
more important. 
 
Table 3. Panel data. First differenced Instrumental Variables (Arellano) 
 Adjacency Normalized adjacency Distance weight 
Explanatory variables Imputation Corruption Imputation Corruption Imputation Corruption 
Neighbour accused (or 
imputation) 
0.067 (0.009)*** 0.031 (0.058)*** 0.383 (0.049)*** 0.166 (0.05)*** 0.365 (0.051)*** 0.148 (0.05)*** 
Demographical change -0.032 (0.015)** -0.006 (0.017) -0.028 (0.015)* -0.012 (0.017) -0.031 (0.015)** -0.011 (0.017) 
Property gross tax base 2e-9 (8e-10)*** -2e-10 (9e-10) 3e-9 (8e-10)*** -3e-11 (9e-10) 3e-9 (8e-10)*** -1e-11 (9e-10) 
Population density 1e-4 (2e-5)*** 1e-4 (2e-5)*** 1e-4 (2e-5)*** 1e-4 (2e-5)*** 1e-4 (2e.5)*** 1e-4 (2e-5)*** 
Index of economic activity -5e-6 (2e-5) -8e-5 (3e-4)** -5e-6 (2e-5) -8e-5 (3e-4)** -4e-6 (2e-5) -8e-5 (3e-5)** 
Constant 0.004 (6e-4)*** 0.002 (6e-4)*** 0.004 (6e-4)*** 0.002 (6e-4)*** 0.004 (6e-4)*** 0.002 (6e-4)*** 
Observations 27,417 27,417 27,417 27,417 27,417 27,417 
Wald chi2(5) 109.69*** 58.77*** 115.48*** 40.95*** 105.56*** 38.65*** 
R2 (within/between/overall) 0.03/ 0.003/ 0.003 
0.008 / 0.0008 / 
0.0001 
0.03 / 0.003/ 0.003 
0.005 / 0.0005 / 
0.0001 
0.03 / 0.003 / 0.003 
0.005 / 0.0006 / 
0.0001 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
 
 Panel data estimation yields several interesting outcomes. Firstly, that corruption appears 
more frequently in municipalities with: a higher property gross tax rate (ie among wealthier 
populations), but with a lower index of economic activity; a greater density of population; 
and, a population that is falling. It seems that businessmen decide to tempt local politicians 
(and they in turn decide to accept) in rich towns or cities that are in decline 
demographically. Due to the high collinearity of the economic variables used as controls, 
and the small variation through time in each municipality, these estimates lack reliability.  
The most important result is the significance and coefficient of corruption/imputation in 
the neighbourhood: ceteris paribus, the contagious effect exists both for corruption and for 
imputation (from the perspective of both corruption and the law). Regarding the former, 
each corrupted municipality you have as a neighbour increases the likelihood of a crime of 
corruption being commited by 3.1 per cent. 
However, the good news is that, by using the imputation date, each imputed municipality 
you have as a neighbour increases the likelihood of exposing a case with legal action by 6.7 
per cent. This positive derivative offsets the contagion problem and makes it much easier 
for authorities to locate cases of local corruption and to allocate law enforcement resources 
in certain areas. This is not the first time that this contagious effect has been identified. 
Becker et al (2009) concluded that “a change in a country's institutions to reduce 
corruption will also reduce corruption in neighbouring countries”. From another 
perspective, Carrell et al (2008), found that one additional college cheater creates 0.55 to 
0.80 new college cheaters (they studied self-reported academic honour violations from the 
classes of 1959 through 2002 at three major U.S. military service academies). 
In our case, as in Carrell et al (2008) the contaigous effect could be an effect of the 
evolving social norm of tolerance for corruption, and/or an effect of congestion in 
enforcement of local governments. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Although corruption is a major problem in developing countries, a new version of this 
social problem has arisen in recent years in developed ones: political corruption. And this 
problem not only affects central and/or regional governments, but also local ones. 
Academic literature has analyzed the effects of corruption on key topics such as economic 
growth, liability, voting behaviour, etc. But, as far as we know, a geographical analysis at 
local level had not been undertaken prior to this study. In this regard, our main aim has 
been to test whether spatial interdependence exists in local corruption cases. Confirmation 
of this fact will be important to help authorities identify new corruption cases and to to 
allocate resources among judges, anticorruption agencies, etc. 
A report by the EU (European Commission, 2014) observes that there is great variation 
between good and bad governance across Spain. The geographic variation of cases of 
political corruption might be a consequence of the contagious phenomenon we measure in 
this article. Using data from Spain, and based on the local corruption boom in the 2000s, a 
panel database (2001-2010) on local characteristics, economy and cases of imputation for 
corruption at local level has been constructed. Our empirical strategy has been to undertake 
a spatial econometric model that allows for cross-sectional interdependence. However, we 
not only performed a cross-sectional analysis, but also implemented a dynamic approach 
that greatly increases the number of observations and allows us to model the start of a 
corruption case as a function of the neighbours past or contemporary cases of corruption. 
Our spatial econometrics methodology supports the hypothesis that corruption is not 
local-specific and two opposite outcomes arise: on the one hand, local corruption is 
contagious and the probability of being infected increases by 3.1 per cent for each 
neighbouring municipality corrupted; on the other hand the likelihood of being taken to 
court increases by 6.7 per cent for each neighbouring municipality accused. Although the 
former is alarming, the latter provides hope in the fight against local corruption.  
A limitation of the study is that we analyse accusations; not only those cases resulting in a 
guilty verdict (data not available). Nevertheless, they represent the large majority of the 
corruption cases in Spain. 
These results allow us to make some policy recommendations. Spatial contagion in corrupt 
behaviour indicates the importance of combating local corruption, which not only 
generates welfare losses to the municipality, but also results in negative spillovers for 
nearby municipalities. Broader territorial agencies responsible for combating local 
corruption could contribute to reduce the problem. This help could be in the form of 
bureaucratic supervision from a higher organism, such as establishing transparency 
standards so that, for example, citizens of a particular municipality are more able to control 
their leaders. Regarding the spatial contagion of corruption, it should be recommended to 
the courts that once a case of municipal corruption is detected, it is worth investigating 
nearby municipalities, as the probability of them also having acted corruptly is greater. In 
any case, as our results reflect not only spillover effects (contagion), but also the effect of 
contextual conditions, combating local corruption also requires individual actions that 
could be specific to each municipality. However, on the other hand, this study has only 
measured contagion between municipalities; it has not taken into consideration contagion 
within a municipality. 
This research could be complemented by other studies and extended in some ways, for 
example by gathering additional information. We plan to check for determinants of 
indictments, such as pressure from the local press (investigative journalism), and seek to 
differentiate by the intensity of corruption (in terms of euros). We also plan to test if 
contagion of corruption is more probable between politicians from the same political party. 
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